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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the notion of superior responsibility
of civilians for international crimes committed in civilian
settings. The doctrine of superior responsibilitygrew out of the
military doctrine of command responsibility,and its evolution is
informed by this origin. Jurisprudenceand academic writers
emphasize that the doctrine is applicable to civilian superiors of
military or paramilitaryorganizations, but there has never been
a detailed analysis of the doctrine's relevance and applicability
in civilian settings. The Article argues that the claim that
customary international law extends the doctrine of superior
responsibility to civilians, let alone in civilian settings, is
inaccurate. In judicial practice, including recent rulings,
civilians have rarely been convicted under the doctrine even as
leaders of military organizations, and when they have, these
convictions were generally secondary to their direct
responsibility. The Article elaborates various challenges to the
application of the doctrine in civilian settings, particularly in
the determination of the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship. Despite the difficulties in transposing the doctrine
to the civilian sphere, the Article argues that, as a matter of
policy, civilians should also be subject to the doctrine. It also
contends that the normative distinctions between civilians and
military superiors, today entrenched in Article 28 of the
International Criminal Court Statute, are neither absolutely
necessary nor practicable.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Appeals Chamber confirmed the conviction of Ferdinand Nahimana
for public and direct incitement to genocide and crimes against
humanity, and it sentenced him to thirty years imprisonment.'
Nahimana, a former university lecturer and former director of the
Rwandan Ministry of Information, was the founder and director of
RTLM, the only private radio station operating in Rwanda in 19931994, which served as a platform for a genocidal media campaign

1.
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment (Nov. 28,
2007) (affirming conviction on some counts and reducing sentence from life
imprisonment to thirty years).
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against the Tutsi population in Rwanda.2 Nahimana himself never
broadcast on RTLM. He was convicted under the doctrine of superior
responsibility for failing to prevent the broadcasters from inciting to
genocide in their programs or to punish them for having done so. 3
The doctrine of superior responsibility, known traditionally as
command responsibility,4 is well established, although its precise
nature and content remain controversial. 5 One jurisprudential line
has been to treat it as responsibility of the superior for the crimes
committed by his subordinates, 6 whereas another has been to treat it
as a separate offence of dereliction by the superior of his duty to
properly supervise his subordinates. 7 Recent jurisprudence supports
the latter interpretation.8

2.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-IT-99-52-T, Judgment, 5, 48688 (Dec. 3, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment,
1 122 (Dec. 2, 2008) (concluding that RTLM was a vehicle for anti-Tutsi propaganda as
of at least the end of 1993).
For an overview of aspects of the Nahimana Appeal Judgment other than
3.
superior responsibility, see Sophia Kagan, The "Media Case" Before the Rwanda
Tribunal: The Nahimana et al. Appeal Judgment, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 83 (2008),
available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/HJJ-JJH/Vol_3(1)/MediaCase_
KaganEN.pdf (discussing the decision generally); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
InternationalDecisions: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Brayagwize, & Ngeze, 103 AM. J.
INT'L L. 97, 97-103 (2009) (discussing the appeals court's temporal analysis of the
incitement to violence).
4.
For discussion see infra text accompanying notes 9-14.
5.
See Beatrice I. Bonaf6, Findinga Proper Role for Command Responsibility,
5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 599, 604-11 (2007) (discussing the limited application of superior
responsibility in practice); Mirjan Damaika, The Shadow Side of Command
Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 458-71 (2001) (discussing the divergence of
superior responsibility in international law from similar principles in municipal law);
Arthur T. O'Reilly, Command Responsibility: A Call to Realign the Doctrine with
Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 99-101 (2004-2005) (arguing that superior
responsibility should be applied less broadly).
6.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 471
(Sept. 2, 1998) (discussing "the principle of the liability of a commander for the acts of
his subordinates"); 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 558-60 (2005); Payam Akhavan, The Crime of
Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 989, 993 (2005) ('This
doctrine provides that a superior is criminally responsible for the acts committed by his
subordinates."); see also Kevin Jon Heller, Rome Statute in Comparative Perspective
29-30 (Melbourne Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 370, 2008), availableat
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1304539 (stating that Article 28
holds superiors responsible for the actual crimes of their subordinates). The generic
masculine pronoun will be used here to refer to both genders.

7.

Nicholas Tsagourias, Command Responsibility and the Principle of

Individual Criminal Responsibility: A CriticalAnalysis of InternationalJurisprudence,
in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE NAVI PILLAY (William Schabas
ed., forthcoming Brill 2010) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with the author) (internal
citations omitted); see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-0147-T, Judgment, 75 (Mar. 15, 2006) (treating failure to prevent or punish crimes as a
separate offense from the crimes).
8.
The two interpretations may be compared to the distinction between
vicarious liability and a direct duty of care. Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68-T,
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Four elements must be proven for a person to be held responsible
as a superior. In general terms, these are:9 (1) an international crime
has been perpetrated by someone other than the defendant; (2) there
existed a superior-subordinate relationship between the defendant
and the perpetrator; (3) the defendant as a superior knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such crimes
or had done so;10 and (4) the defendant as a superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such crimes or punish
the perpetrator."
Under the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Statute, there is a further requirement of a causal link between the
superior's dereliction of duty and the commission of the crime.12 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and ICTR Statutes do not distinguish between types of superiors,
while ICC Statute Article 28 expressly provides for the responsibility
of both military commanders (and persons effectively acting as
military commanders) and other superiors.' 3
The doctrine of superior responsibility grew out of the military
doctrine of command responsibility, and its evolution is informed by
this origin.14 This raises the question on which this Article focuseswhether the doctrine is suited for application in a civilian setting.
Part II examines existing jurisprudence and argues that the claim
that superior responsibility extends to civilians as a matter of a
customary law is inaccurate. Judicial practice demonstrates that
civilians have rarely been convicted under the doctrine and that,
when they have, these convictions were generally secondary to their

Judgment,

T 293

(June 30, 2006); HECTOR OLASOLO, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF

SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES

106 (2009); Tsagourias, supra note 7 (manuscript at 12, on file with the author)
(describing command liability as a separate type of liability for a failure to act);

Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility: Mode of Liability for the Crimes of
Subordinates or Separate Offence of the Superior?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 619, 633-37
(2007) (discussing the implications of treating superior responsibility as a separate
offense). For a nuanced interpretation of ICC Statute Article 28 see Volker Nerlich,

Superior Responsibility underArticle 28 ICC Statute: For What Exactly is the Superior
Held Responsible?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 665, 668-71 (2007) (arguing that in most
contexts, superiors should only be held accountable for failing to control their
subordinates, not for the subordinates' actual crimes).
9.
Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-T, 293.
10.
This standard of mens rea applies to both the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.
The ICC Statute provides different standards, as discussed infra Part II.A.
11.
Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-T, 293.
12.
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, T 423 (June 15, 2009).
13.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 28, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute];
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
14.
Bonaf6, supra note 5, at 601-02.
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direct responsibility. Part III elaborates various challenges to the
application of the doctrine in civilian settings, particularly with
respect to the determination of the existence of a superiorsubordinate relationship. Part IV examines the Nahimana case in
light of the preceding analysis and conclusions. The analysis gives
rise to the question whether the doctrine should be transposed to the
civilian sphere. Part V considers superior responsibility in civilian
settings de lege ferenda and argues that, despite the difficulties that
arise, civilians should also be subject to the doctrine. It also argues
against the normative distinctions between civilians and military
superiors that are entrenched in Article 28 of the ICC Statute.

II. CIVILIAN SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY: LExLATA
A. InternationalInstruments
Command responsibility is codified in Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. Article 87(1) provides:' 5
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed
forces under their command and other persons under their control, to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.

The responsibility of "superiors" is triggered, according to Article
8 6 (2 ),16 "if they knew, or had information which should have enabled
them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was
committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not
take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress
the breach." This provision is not limited to military commanders,
although it has been interpreted as applying primarily to them.' 7 In

15.
Prosecutor v. Delalid (Celebici Case), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
734 (Nov. 16, 1998) ('The criminal responsibility of commanders for the unlawful
conduct of their subordinates is a very well settled norm of customary and conventional
international law. It is now a provision of Article 7(3) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal and articles 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I."). For a
historical account of the development of command responsibility see William H. Parks,

Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, (1973).
16.
Shany and Michaeli argue that Article 86(2) concerns the responsibility of
military commanders for the crimes committed by subordinates under their command
and control, while Article 87(1) concerns the responsibility of military commanders for
dereliction of duty to control persons under their command or control. Yuval Shany &

Keren R. Michaeli, The CaseAgainst Ariel Sharon: Revisiting the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 797, 840 (2002).
17.
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1011
(1987). For a proposed interpretation of the relationship between art 86(2) and art
87(1), see Shany & Michaeli, supra note 16, at 863-64.
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eelebi6i, the ICTY relied on the International Law Commission (ILC)
commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes against Mankind18 to point
out that Articles 86(2) and 87(1) extend to civilian superiors. Yet the
ILC had explained that "this principle [of responsibility of superiors]
applies not only to the immediate superior of a subordinate, but also
to his other superiors in the military chain of command or the
governmental hierarchy if the necessary criteria are met."1 9 Thus,
the ILC appears to have envisaged civilians only as indirect superiors
of military personnel (whose direct superiors are also military
personnel). It does not appear to have considered the possibility of a
civilian setting where neither superior nor subordinates perform
military or paramilitary functions. Furthermore, Additional Protocol
I leaves certain issues unresolved. First, it establishes responsibility
only for breaches of the Additional Protocol and the Geneva
Conventions, namely war crimes. 20 Such crimes are by definition
related to armed conflict and are therefore more likely to be
committed by military or paramilitary personnel.2 '
Second,
Additional Protocol I does not establish superior responsibility for
crimes against humanity or genocide as such.
ICTR Statute Article 6(3) and ICTY Statute Article 7(3)
(hereinafter Article 6/7(3)) contain a provision resembling Article
86(2):
The fact that any of the acts referred to in . . . the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate
was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to
punish the perpetrators thereof.

Both tribunals have interpreted their respective statutes as
permitting the attachment of responsibility to both military and nonmilitary superiors.2 2

18.

Delalie, Case No. IT-96-21-T,

19.

Commentary on the Articles of the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace

378.

and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 25, U.N. Doc.
A/CA.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2) (emphasis added).
20.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
87, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter Protocol I].
21.
Id. art. 3.
22.
For the ICTY, see Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 363 ("Thus, it must be
concluded that the applicability of the principle of superior responsibility in Article 7(3)
extends not only to military commanders but also to individuals in non-military
positions of superior authority."). For the ICTR, see Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case
No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 42 (June. 7, 2001) ("There can be no doubt, therefore,
that the doctrine of command responsibility extends beyond the responsibility of
military commanders to encompass civilian superiors in positions of authority."). For
more discussion of cases, see also infra Parts II.B.2-3.
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Finally, ICC Statute Article 28 expressly provides for the
responsibility of both military commanders (and persons effectively
acting as military commanders) and other superiors:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this
Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such
forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described
in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under
his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure
to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and
23
prosecution.

Article 28 distinguishes the responsibility of military commanders
and persons effectively acting as military commanders from the
responsibility of other superiors in two respects. First, the standard
of mens rea required for the latter ("knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated") is higher than that required for
the former ("knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known"). 24
Second, a civilian superior's responsibility is
expressly limited to crimes that are related to the activities within his
effective responsibility and control.2 5

23.
24.
25.

Rome Statute, supranote 13, art. 28.
Id.
Id.
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B. Jurisprudenceon SuperiorResponsibility of Civilians
The history of the doctrine of command responsibility dates back
to antiquity, but international prosecutions based on the doctrine did
not occur until the aftermath of World War 11.26 Post-World War II
jurisprudence was overwhelmingly concerned with superiors in the
military. 27 The criminal responsibility of civilians only arose in full
force in the ICTY and ICTR. 28 In fact, even the leading post-1990
case on the applicability of the doctrine to civilians, the ICTY's
eelebi6i, concerned individuals whose statuses were not entirely clear
and who operated in a paramilitary setting. 29
The ICTY in eelebiti and subsequent cases-as well as the
ICTR-have posited that the responsibility of civilians for their
subordinates' actions is a customary legal principle,30 reflected in
post-World War II jurisprudence.3 1 Yet as the analysis below reveals,
this jurisprudence does not clearly provide the authority asserted by
the ad hoc tribunals.
The tribunals themselves have rarely
considered the superior responsibility of civilians in purely civilian
settings.
1.

Jurisprudence in the Aftermath of World War II

Despite the absence of express provisions on superior
responsibility in its statute, the International Military Tribunal for

26.

For discussion of pre-World War II practice, see Leslie C. Green Command

Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 319, 320-27 (1996).
On this jurisprudence, see ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL
27.
RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LA W 119-35 (2003) (discussing post-World War II prosecutions); Matthew Lippman,

The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility, 13 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 139, 142-

52 (2000) (same).
28.
In the interim period it arose, in a purely military context, with respect to
the responsibility of Captain Medina in the US attack in My Lai. However, Medina was
indicted (and acquitted) under domestic US law. Note, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 82 YALE L.J. 1274, 1274 n.3 (1973).
29.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, $ 610
(Nov. 16, 1998) (defendant was appointed coordinator of defense forces and played a
key role in military affairs).
333 ("That military commanders and other persons occupying
30.
Id.
positions of superior authority may be held criminally responsible for the unlawful
conduct of their subordinates is a well-established norm of customary and conventional
international law."). For further examples see Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-9514-T, Judgment, $ 290 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13A, Judgment,
127-28 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case
No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, $ 208-12 (May 21, 1999); Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21T,
343; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 6, at 561; Shany & Michaeli,
supra note 16, at 803.
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing this jurisprudence).
31.
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the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) convicted a number of individualsboth military personnel and civilians-on that basis.
The indictment in the Tokyo Tribunal contained two separate
counts that are relevant for present purposes. Count 54 related to
"orders, authorizations and permissions," while Count 55 alleged that
the defendants "deliberately and recklessly disregarded their legal
duty to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent
breaches" of the laws of war.3 2 The Oelebidi Trial Chamber cited four
convictions by the Tokyo Tribunal as authorities for civilian superior
responsibility, namely those of General Matsui, Prime Minister Tojo,
and Foreign Ministers Hirota and Shigemitsu. 33
General Matsui was, as his title indicates, a military person.34
He was the commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force and
Central China Area Army. Hence, his conviction does not constitute a
precedent for the principle of superior responsibility of civilians. The
tribunal found Prime Minister Tojo guilty of war crimes under Count
54 "for the instruction that prisoners who did not work should not
eat,"35 but made no finding under Count 55. Tojo was found
responsible directly rather than for failing to prevent his
subordinates from engaging in illegal conduct. 36
Foreign Ministers Hirota and Shigemitsu were convicted under
Count 55 for their failure to adequately act upon reports of war
crimes. Hirota received reports of the Nanking atrocities. He took
the matter up with the War Ministry and received assurances that
the atrocities would be stopped.3 7 The tribunal found that, when the
atrocities continued, Hirota "was content to rely on assurances which
he knew were not being implemented" instead of "insisting before the
Cabinet that immediate action be taken to put an end to the
atrocities, failing any other action open to him to bring about the
same result."3 8
Similarly, during Shigemitsu's term the Allied
powers repeatedly protested to the Japanese Foreign Office regarding
violations of the laws of armed conflict relating to prisoners-of-war.
These protests were met without exception by a denial from the
military authorities. The Tribunal held that the circumstances made
Shigemitsu suspicious that the treatment of the prisoners was not as
it should have been, yet he took no adequate steps to investigate the

32.
1 THE ToKYo JUDGMENT XV-XVI (B.V.A. R6ling & C.F. Riuter eds., 1977).
33.
Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, TT 357-58 (Nov.
16, 1998).
34.
United States v. Araki, Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Nov. 4-12, 1948), reprinted in 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 32, at
1, 453.
35.
Id. at 463.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 447.
38.
Id. at 448.
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matter.3 9 The Tribunal emphasized Shigemitsu's failure to take
adequate steps to investigate the matter "although he, as a member
of government, bore overhead responsibility for the welfare of
prisoners."40 It held both ministers responsible for failing to induce
the government to discharge its obligation to ensure the well-being of
prisoners-of-war and civilians under its control. 4 1 Importantly,
neither case involved a claim that the Minister was the direct or
indirect superior of the perpetrators or that he could have directly
affected their conduct. 42 The ministers' responsibility under Count 55
was based on their dereliction of duty as members of the
governmental collective. 43
Judge R61ing, who dissented, would have acquitted both
ministers. 4 4 He had general reservations about reliance on the
doctrine and cautioned in particular about holding civilian
government officials responsible for the behavior of the army in the
field.45 On the facts, he opined that Hirota did not know of the crimes
and that the government was at any rate powerless to act because it
"had very little influence with the Services." 4 6 With respect to
Shigemitsu, he pointed out that the minister had no legal obligation
to probe and investigate the information he had received, 47 as
required by the doctrine of superior responsibility.
In Celebii, the ICTY also relied on two post-World War II cases
heard by national military tribunals. 48 One is Flick,4 9 in which a
German industrialist was accused, along with his nephew Weiss, of
committing war crimes and crimes against humanity through his
industrial enterprises by enslaving and deporting members of the
civilian populations of occupied territories, enslaving concentration
camp inmates, and using prisoners-of-war in war operations. The
U.S. military tribunal emphasized "[t]he active steps taken by Weiss

39.
United States v. Araki, supra note 34, at 458.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 447, 458-59.
42.
For critiques of the Ministers' conviction on the basis of superior
responsibility, see GUtNARL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 10405 (2009); Daniel Watt, Stepping Forward or Stumbling Back?: Command

Responsibility for Failure to Act, Civilian Superiors and the International Criminal
Court, 17 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 163-65 (2008).
ILIAS BANTEKAS, PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT AND SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN
43.
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 106 (2002).
44.
United States v. Araki, supra note 34, at 1041, 1127, 1133.
45.
Id. at 1062, 1127.
46.
Id. at 1124.
47.
Id. at 1138.
Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, IT 359-62 (Nov.
48.
16, 1998).
49.
Trial of Friedrich Flick and Five Others, IX L.R.T.W.C. 1, U.S. Mil.
Tribunal, (Apr. 20, 1947-Dec. 22, 1947).
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with the knowledge and approval of Flick." so The UN War Crimes
Commission's note, on which the Trial Chamber in Celebii relied,5 1
says that
nothing more than "knowledge and approval' of Weiss's acts on the part
of Flick is mentioned in the Judgment, but it seems clear that the
decision of the Tribunal to find him guilty was an application of the
responsibility of a superior for the acts of his inferiors which he has a
52
duty to prevent.

Why this "seems clear" remains unexplained. The tribunal may well
have regarded Flick's approval as a positive contribution to Weiss's
conduct through tacit permission, in which case Flick's wrongdoing
went further than merely not preventing Weiss's conduct.5 3
Another case cited by the Trial Chamber in Celebiti is Roechling,
in which German industrialists were found responsible for ill
treatment of forced laborers. 54 The French military tribunal clarified
that the defendants were "not accused of having ordered this horrible
treatment, but of having permitted it; and indeed supported it, and in
addition, of not having done their utmost to put an end to these
The defendants' responsibility, at the basis of the
abuses."55
conviction in Roechling, appears to have been based on their direct
engagement through the "support" of the crimes. 56 It may have been
more appropriate to classify it as "aiding and abetting." The last
segment of the charge, the failure to put an end to the abuses, may be
a more useful example of the application of the doctrine of superior
responsibility. However, as will be explained below, there is some
incongruity in holding a person responsible for not putting an end to
conduct to which he contributed either actively or tacitly.57

50.

Id. at 20.

Delali5, Case No. IT-96-21-T, T 360.
51.
Trial of Friedric Flick and Five Others, supranote 49, at 54.
52.
This is the thin line between indirect responsibility for knowingly failing to
53.
prevent, and direct responsibility for assisting by silent acquiescence. Under Count 54
of the Tokyo indictment, permission gave rise to direct responsibility. Compare
Prosecutor v. Orid, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, T 292-93 (June 30, 2006) ("[flor
finding of .. . aiding and abetting, there ought to be a certain contribution to the
commission of the principal crime, superior criminal responsibility is characterised by
the mere omission of preventing or punishing crimes committed by (subordinate)
others."); Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment, 1 23 (Sept. 11,
2006) (discussing aiding and abetting liability), with Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case
No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment, $ 20 (June. 22, 2009) (discussing omission liability).
54.
Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96--21-T, Judgment, T 361 (Nov. 16,
1998) (citing The Government Commissioner of the General Tribunal of the Military
Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany v. Roechling, Indictment
and Judgment of the General Tribunal of the Military Government of the French Zone
of Occupation in Germany, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. XIV, app. B, p. 1061).
55.
Id. at 1072-74.
Id.
56.
57.
See infra text accompanying note 106 (discussing this incongruity).
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In conclusion, the ICTY's assertion in Oelebiei that superior
responsibility was an established principle of customary international
law with respect to civilian superiors, particularly in civilian settings,
is at least open to question. The Tokyo judgments, while supporting
the notion of civilian superior responsibility (but not in a civilian
setting), are fraught with difficulties. The other cases do not clearly
address superior responsibility and instead focus on direct
responsibility. Be that as it may, the jurisprudence of the ICTY and
ICTR in those cases where civilians were indicted under Article 6/7(3)
may have created-or at least contributed to the development ofcustomary international law on the matter.58 The next subpart
examines this jurisprudence.
2.

ICTY Case Law

The ICTY case law to date does not contain any instance of an
indictment on the basis of superior responsibility in a civilian setting.
The existing case law concerns civilians operating in military
settings, where their civilian status is sometimes almost accidental.
In Oelebii and Aleksovski, the defendants were the de facto
commanders of prison camps where combatants and civilians were
detained.59 They were responsible for conditions in the camps, with
de facto authority over the officers, guards, and detainees.6 0 In both
cases, the defendants were held responsible for failing to repress
crimes that their subordinates had committed. 61 They were also held
directly responsible for other crimes. 62 In neither case did the ICTY
make a clear finding on whether the defendants were civilians. 63
In a few other cases where civilians were indicted under the
principle of superior responsibility, they were all acquitted.
Moreover, the settings were not civilian. Dario Kordic was a civilian
leading militia forces in the Bosnian-Croat community in Bosnia-

58.
Both international jurisprudence and secondary literature regard
international jurisprudence as generating customary international law, while this is a
function traditionally reserved to states. The validity of reliance on international
jurisprudence to identify customary international law is outside the scope of this
article.
59.
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21, Indictment,
2-3 (Mar. 21,
1996); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14, Indictment, T 26 (Nov. 10, 1995).
27 (June.
60.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment,
25, 1999); Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
737, 1240, 1243
(Nov. 16, 1998).
61.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, 1 31; Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, T
775 ("Mr. Mucik is accordingly criminally responsible for the acts of the personnel in
the Celebi6i prison-camp, on the basis of the principle of superior responsibility.").
62.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, 378; Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
1 1237.
63.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, 76 (Mar. 24,
2000); Aleksouski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, 103; Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 735.
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Herzegovina. 64 He was acquitted of responsibility with respect to
crimes committed by the militias because he did not possess the
authority to prevent the crimes or punish the perpetrators. 65 Milan
Milutinovid was the President of Serbia in 1998 and 1999.66 He was
indicted in connection with crimes committed in the first half of 1999
in Kosovo by the military forces of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, those of the Republic of Serbia, and the internal security
forces governed by the Serb Ministry of Interior. He was acquitted
because he did not have direct effective control over the direct
perpetrators of the crimes. 67 Ljube Boikoski was Minister of Interior
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). He was
indicted for failure to punish his subordinate members of a police unit
for crimes they committed in August 2001, of which he came to know
only after their commission. The ICTY Trial Chamber found that
Boikoski had the power to control and direct the police 68 but that he
had taken appropriate measures to trigger an enforcement
mechanism against the perpetrators of the crimes, thus discharging
his responsibility for the purposes of Article 7(3) of the Statute. 69
Another civilian indicted under the doctrine, with respect to
military subordinates, was Slobodan Milogevid, former and late
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of
Serbia. He was indicted under the doctrine of superior responsibility
for crimes that the Yugoslav army, of which he was commander-inchief, and the Serb internal security forces committed. He died before
the conclusion of proceedings.70
Finally, Radovan Karadzic, former President of Republika
Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was indicted in connection with
crimes that the Bosnian Serb forces and "Bosnian Serb Political and
Governmental Organs" perpetrated. 7 ' The indictment does not define
the latter, but they are presumably civilian organizations. At the
time of writing, this case is pending appeal. 72

64.
2001).

Prosecutor v. Kordid, Case No.

IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment,

1

5 (Feb. 26,

Id. 1 839-41.
65.
Profile: Milan Milutinovid, BBC NEWS, Jan. 27, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
66.
2/hileurope/1935954.stm.
Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. ICTY-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol. 3, IT
67.
106, 160, 1207 (Feb. 26, 2009).
Prosecutor v. Boikoski, Case No. ICTY-04-82-T, Judgment, 1 514 (July 19,
68.
2008).
At the time of writing, this case is pending appeal.
69.
Prosecutor v. Milogevk, Case No. IT-02-54, Case Information Sheet,
70.
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan-milosevic/cis/en/cis-milosevic-slobodan.pdf.
Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Third Amended
Prosecutor v. Karadii,
71.
Indictment, 1 3, 32-35 (Feb. 27, 2009).
Prosecutor v. Karadic, Case No. IT-95-5/18, Case Information Sheet,
72.
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/ cis/en/cis_karadzicen.pdf.
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ICTR Case Law

Seven civilians were indicted in the ICTR prior to Nahimana.
Five of them were government officials, three of whom were
acquitted, each for a different reason. Jean Paul Akayesu was
bourgmestre of Taba.7 3 He was indicted for both direct and superior
responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimeS 74
committed by the Interahamwe, whom the judgment referred to as
"armed local militia."75 According to the indictment, Akayesu knew
that the crimes were being committed, facilitated them, and
encouraged them. 76 The ICTR expressed some reservation about
relying upon superior responsibility with respect to civilians, in view
of Judge R61ing's opinion in the Tokyo Trial. The ICTR then said that
it should examine each case on its merits.77 In any event, the ICTR
found that "a superior/subordinate relationship existed between the
Accused and the Interahamwe who were at the bureau communal."
The ICTR then puzzlingly noted that there was no allegation in the
indictment that the Interahamwe were subordinates of the accused,
although the indictment relied on Article 6(3).78 Accordingly, it
acquitted Akayesu of responsibility as a superior.79
Ignace Bagilishema, bourgmestre of Mabanza, was indicted for
genocide and crimes against humanity under ICTR Statute Articles
6(1) and 6(3).8o The ICTR acquitted him of all charges because the
crimes themselves had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In one case, the Trial Chamber found that a criminal act had been
committed by subordinates of Bagilishema, but it was not proven that

73.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 1 77 (Sept. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, Amended Indictment, IT 2-4
(June 17, 1997).
74.
These are violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol 2.
75.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1 691. The Interahamwe were the youth
movement of the MRND. "During the war, the term also covered anyone who had antiTutsi tendencies, irrespective of their political background, and who collaborated with
the MRND youth." Id. 1 151.
76.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I,
12A, 12B.
77.
Id. 1 491.
78.
Id. 1 691.
79.
The Trial Chamber in Oelebiei held that the "law does not know of a
universal superior without a corresponding subordinate." Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1 647 (Nov. 16, 1998). However, the statement of the Trial
Chamber in Akayesu may be related to the procedural defect of the absence in the
indictment of the claim that Akayesu was the superior of the Interahamwe or that they
were his subordinates. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 1 471.
80.
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-01A-A, Judgment, 1 4 (July
3, 2002).
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he knew or had reason to know of the crime.8 1 Thus, the ICTR could
not apply the doctrine on factual grounds.
Juv6nal Kajelijeli was bourgmestre of Mukingo and founder and
leader of the Mukingo Interahamwe.8 2 The Trial Chamber convicted
him on the basis of both direct and superior responsibility with
respect to acts of the Interahamwe.8 3 However, the Appeals Chamber
determined that where convictions are possible under both types of
responsibility in relation to the same count based on the same facts,
direct responsibility should prevail over superior responsibility to the
exclusion of the latter. 84 Accordingly, the ICTR convicted Kajelijeli
under Article 6(1) and acquitted him of the charges based on his
status as superior.85
The ICTR convicted two government officials on the basis of
superior responsibility.
Jean Kambanda held office as Prime
Minister of Rwanda from April 8, 1994, to July 17, 1994. He pled
guilty and was convicted of genocide; genocide-related crimes; and
crimes against humanity in connection with crimes committed by his
subordinate
prefects,
bourgmestres,
other
administrative
functionaries, and various armed forces and groups. 86
C16ment Kayishema was the prefect of Kibuye. 87
He was
convicted of genocide and related crimes, having ordered and
orchestrated attacks by both administrative bodies and law
enforcement
agencies
(bourgmestres, communal police, and
gendarmerie)8 8 against Tutsis. He participated, aided, and abetted in
them.89
The ICTR convicted both Kambanda and Kayishema

81.
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-01A-A, 30.
82.
Kajelijelii v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment,
2 (May
23, 2005).
83.
Prosecutor v. Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and
Sentence,
836-45 (Dec. 1, 2003).
84.
See Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A,
81, following the approach of
the ICTY in both Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment,
IT 34-35 (Dec. 17, 2004), and Prosecutor v. Blagkk, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment,
T 91-92 (July 29, 2004), that where the legal requirements pertaining to both of these
heads of responsibility are met, a Trial Chamber should enter a conviction on the basis
of direct responsibility only, and consider the accused's superior position as an
aggravating factor in sentencing. For expressions of different views in the ICTY on the
relationship between 6/7(1) and 6/7(3), see Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 321 (Jan. 27, 2007)
and Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 1 341-43 (June 30, 2006).
85.
Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, 325.
86.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence,
TT 39-40 (Sept. 4, 1998).
87.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,
T 5 (June 1, 2001).
88.
Id. 475, Verdict.
89.
Id. 473.
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concurrently under articles 6(1) and 6(3).90 These cases concerned
both civilian and paramilitary settings.9 1
Two other civilian defendants were Serushago and Musema.
Omar Serushago was a de facto leader of the Interahamwe in
Gisenyi.92 The ICTR convicted him under both Articles 6(1) and 6(3)
of genocide and crimes against humanity for having ordered the
Interahamwe to execute victims. 93 Alfred Musema was the director of
the public Gisovu Tea Factory and a member of various regional
government authorities that addressed socioeconomic
and
developmental matters. 94 According to the indictment, at various
locations and times, Musema directed armed individuals to attack
Tutsis seeking refuge.95 He also personally attacked and killed
persons seeking refuge; committed acts of rape; and encouraged
others to capture, rape, and kill Tutsi women. 96 The ICTR convicted
Musema of genocide and crimes against humanity.9 7 The Trial
Chamber found him responsible under Article 6(1) of the Statute for
having ordered and, by his presence and participation, aided and
abetted in the crimes.9 8 In addition, the Chamber found that
Musema incurred superior responsibility under Article 6(3) of the
Statute" with respect to acts by employees of the Gisovu Tea
Factory, whom the Chamber identified as Musema's subordinates. 0 0

90.

According to the court, Kambanda admitted:

that he knew or should have known that persons for whom he was responsible
were committing crimes of massacre upon Tutsi and that he failed to prevent
them or punish the perpetrators. Jean Kambanda admits that he was an eye
witness to the massacres of Tutsi and also had knowledge of them from regular
reports of prefets, and cabinet discussions.
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, $$ 39(xii), 40. The indictment does not support
such a conviction under Article 6(3). The allegation in section 3.11 of the indictment
does not constitute the facts of any of the counts of which Kambanda was convicted: the
allegation in section 3.15, that Kambanda did not respond to the question "how to
secure the protection of surviving children," may more appropriately constitute
complicity by omission than failure to prevent. Id. T1 39, 40.
91.
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, TT 26-50; Kambanda, Case No.
ICTR-97-23-S, 39.
92.
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. 98-39-S, Sentence, T 29 (Feb. 5, 1999).
93.
Id. T 26. Because of the one incident, Serushago was convicted only under
Article 6(3). Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, $ 26; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case
No. ICTR-98-39-I, Indictment, T 5.21 (Oct. 8, 1998).
94.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96--13-A, Judgment, IT 12-16 (Jan.
27, 2000).
95.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-I, Amended Indictment, $ 5.
96.
Id. $ 4.
97.
See Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, $$ 936 (genocide), 951, 958, 961,
968 (crimes against humanity). Some of the convictions for crimes against humanity
were quashed on appeal.
98.
Id.
891, 897, 903, 908, 912, 917, 922.
99.
Id. 1 895, 900, 906, 915, 920, 925.
100.
Id.
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The Tribunal noted that rather than take measures to prevent his
subordinates from acting, Musema abetted in the commission of the
crimes.101

C. Assessment of the Ad Hoc Tribunals' Case Law
In the ICTY, there have been few indictments under the
principle of superior responsibility of persons who were clearly
civilians. This is not surprising, given that the parties to the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia were primarily armed groups. Civilian
superiors were, for the most part, members of the top political
echelons and in charge of military and paramilitary forces. 10 2 The
successful convictions on the basis of superior responsibility of
persons who were not clearly part of the military hierarchy were of
individuals whose civilian status remained undecided and who
operated in a paramilitary setting rather than in a civilian one. 103
In contrast, in Rwanda the armed conflict was secondary to the
genocide, which involved people from all walks of life. Civilians were
directly involved at all levels of perpetration. At the same time, all
seven superior responsibility indictments of civilians prior to
Nahimana were concurrent with and secondary to indictments under
Article 6(1).104 Superior responsibility seems to have served, at
times, to encompass a variety of relationships that generate
responsibility, which could more appropriately have been classified as
instances of aiding and abetting or joint criminal enterprise. 0 5
Indeed, a concurrent conviction under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) makes
little sense; to convict a person for failing to prevent a crime that he

101.
Id. IT 894, 905, 914, 919, 924.
102.
Prosecutor v. Delaci6, Case No. IT-96-21, Indictment, 1T 3-6 (Mar. 19,
1996) (describing the authority of defendants); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT95-14, Indictment, $ 8-21 (Nov. 1995) (same).
103.
Delacie, Case No. IT-96-21,
3-6 (Mar. 19, 1996).
104.
See infra text accompanying note 198 (discussing Serushago, where the
ICTR convicted the defendant under Article 6(3) of its statute for having "played a
leading role" in the crime).
105.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mpambara, Case No. ICTR-01-65-T, Judgment,
11 21-27 (Sept. 11, 2006) (distinguishing between three types of omission and then
proceeding to confuse them, presenting the ICTY's Blaiki6 as one of superior
responsibility based on Article 6/7(1)). On the need to distinguish between the various
forms, see generally Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 159, 162-67 (2007). The Secretary-General in his
report on establishing the ICTY also mentions together the responsibility of superiors
both for ordering the commission of crimes and for failing to prevent them. The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, 1 56, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
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ordered and participated in committing borders on .the absurd.106
The few successful convictions on the basis of superior responsibility
in the ICTR were all concurrent with convictions under Article 6(1),
prior to the Bagilishema Appeal Judgment that changed the practice.
These convictions would not have been possible under current
practice.
In fact, despite repeated statements to the effect that civilian
superior responsibility is an established doctrine in the ad hoc
tribunals, 0 7 the entire jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR prior to
Nahimana offers only two instances of conviction solely on the basis
of superior responsibility, both of which concern military or
paramilitary persons. 08 Nahimana is the first case in which either
tribunal convicted a civilian solely (or even properly) on the basis of
his superior responsibility in a purely civilian setting. 0 9
It
demonstrates a leveling of the playing field between civilians and
military personnel and has been hailed as a "giant leap forward" in
the development of the civilian superior responsibility doctrine."10
The uniqueness of the Nahimana case likely reflects doctrinal
and practical challenges to the application of the doctrine of superior
responsibility in civilian settings. The following Part examines some
of these challenges.
III. CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERIOR
RESPONSIBILITY TO CIVILIAN SETTINGS

A. The Source of the Obligation to Prevent or Punish
in a Civilian Setting
Superior responsibility is based on failure to act. It is thus
incurred only where a legal duty exists to prevent the commission of
crimes." 1 With respect to persons acting as military commanders,1 12

106.

Gu6na6l Mettraux, Current Developments, 1 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 261, 272-

73 (2001); Alexander Zahar, Command Responsibility of Civilian Superiors for
Genocide, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 591, 591-602 (2001).

107.
Jamie A. Williamson, Command Responsibility in the Case Law of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 13 CRIM. L.F. 365, 366 (2002).
108.

Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment,
15, 2006).
109.
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, TT 1044-52
(Nov. 28, 2007).

S 2075 (Mar.

110.
Gregory S. Gordon, "A War of Media, Words, Newspapers, and Radio
Stations": The ICTR Media Trial Verdict and a New Chapterin the InternationalLaw
of Hate Speech, 43 VA. J. INVL L. 140, 189-91 (2004).
111.
Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 1 326 (June 30, 3006);
Prosecutor v. Delacik, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 1 333-34 (Nov. 16, 1998);
United States v. Araki, supra note 34, at 1041, 1063. The present analysis does not
address issues concerning the duty to punish, which raises difficulties of its own.
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Article 87(1) of Additional Protocol 1113 "provides the basis of, and
defines the contours of, the imputed criminal responsibility" under
the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. 114 The ad hoc tribunals have, at
numerous times, noted that superior responsibility is a customary
legal principle.115 This does not automatically expand the scope of
Article 87(1) ratione materiae. Even with respect to military settings,
Article 87(1) or its customary equivalent can only serve as a source of
obligation to prevent violations of the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I. It does not provide a duty to prevent crimes
against humanity or genocide, 11 6 nor does it automatically apply
during a non-international armed conflict.117 In Oelebidi, the ICTY
noted that Article 87(1) imposes the duty to prevent the commission
of violations of "international humanitarian law."" 8 The ICTY's
convictions under the doctrine of superior responsibility were, for the
most part, limited to violations of the laws or customs of war and to
grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.1 19 However, in
both tribunals, the prosecution and the judgments themselves relied
on the doctrine of superior responsibility also with respect to genocide
and crimes against humanity but did not explain the expansion of the
doctrine beyond war crimes.120 As for non-international armed

112.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 369 (2d ed., 1999). But see Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-9613-A, Judgment,
147 (Jan. 27, 2000) (suggesting that Article 86(2) also applies to
civilian superiors).
113.

The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall
require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed
forces under their command and other persons under their control, to
prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent
authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.

Protocol I, supranote 20, art. 87.
114.
Delacid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 334.
115.
Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment,
73 (July 29,
2004); Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid & Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment,
189 (Mar. 15, 2006); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/I-T, Judgment,
73 (June 25, 1999).
116.
That is the case unless, however, the underlying facts also constitute war
cnmes.
117.
See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 17, at 561 (speaking in
terms of being a Party to a conflict).
118.
Delaci6, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 334.
119.
Prosecutor v. Blaskid, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, (Mar. 3, 2000);
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T,
211-29; Delacid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, 1285.
120.
Kordid was indicted for crime against humanity under the doctrine (Count
29) but was acquitted of all charges. Prosecutor v. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-T, TT 834-35; Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Amended
Indictment, Counts 1, 7, 10, 11, 21 (Sept. 30, 1998). From Milutinovic's indictment it is
impossible to know which crimes were alleged to him under the doctrine; he was found
not to have been a superior at all, so that the question of responsibility for specific
crimes did not reach deliberation. Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-T,
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conflicts, the ICTY has ruled that the doctrine applies in those
instances, 121 while the inclusion of the principle in the statute of the
ICTR necessarily indicates that it is regarded as applicable in noninternational armed conflicts.1 22 At any rate, no parallel obligation
expressly existed-at least not until the adoption of the ICC
Statute-with respect to civilian superiors in a civilian setting.
Consequently, both the jiirisprudence and scholars have grappled
with identifying sources of civilian superiors' duty to control their
subordinates. 123
Prior to the adoption of Additional Protocol Article 87(1), this
matter was pertinent also to military commanders.1 24 Thus, in
Yamashita, one of the earliest and most controversial cases in which
a person was convicted on the basis of his superior responsibility, the
United States Supreme Court relied on a commander's obligation to
ensure certain categories of persons' compliance with the laws of war
in specific situations in order to establish a general principle of
command responsibility in international law.' 2 5 It also relied,
however, on the failure to observe positive obligations that were not
related to the status of superiority, such as the obligation of
commanders of occupied territories to maintain public order in the
territory and ensure the welfare of protected persons. 126
Judgment, Vol. 3, 1 283 (Feb. 26, 2009). The ICTR case law is concerned primarily with
genocide and crimes against humanity.
121.
Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility,
31 (July 16, 2003). See also Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Vol. 1, T 113
(asserting that the principle of superior responsibility international and noninternational armed conflicts); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. ICTY-01-42-T,
Judgment,
357 (Jan. 31, 2005) (asserting that the doctrine of superior responsibility
is applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts).
122.
See Sonja Boelaert- Suominen, ProsecutingSuperiorsfor Crimes Committed
by Subordinates: A Discussion of the First Significant Case Law Since the Second
World War, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 772-73 (2001).
123.
Watt, supra note 42, at 159, 171-72.
124.
Protocol I, supranote 20, art. 87.
125.
The Court mentioned Article 19 of the Tenth Hague Convention "relating to
bombardment by naval vessels, [which] provides that commanders in chief of the
belligerent vessels 'must see that the above Articles are properly carried out,"' and
Article 26 of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929, "for the amelioration of the
condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the field, makes it 'the duty of the
commanders-in-chief of the belligerent armies to provide for the details of execution of
the foregoing articles (of the convention) as well as for unforeseen cases."' Yamashita v.
Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946) (quoting Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention art. 19, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2371; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field art. 26, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074).
126.
Id. at 15-16. For an extensive list of positive obligations, see INT'L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 17, at 1008-09. Mettraux argues that the responsibility
of occupation commanders is an exceptional superior responsibility in that it does not
require a chain of command. METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 153, 155. Later, however, he
rightly argues that the responsibility of an occupation commander may be unrelated to
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Yet, it is important to distinguish between an omission which
generates direct responsibility and an omission which generates
superior responsibility. The former may create an obligation of
result, while the latter is an obligation of conduct; the mens rea for
the former is usually stricter than that of the latter, and only the
latter requires establishing a chain of command.127 The ICTR
nonetheless appears to have confused the two. In Kayishema, when
identifying the source of obligation to control subordinates in the duty
to maintain public order, the ICTR said that the question of
responsibility arising from a duty to maintain public order "and any
corresponding failure to execute such a duty, is a question that is
inextricably linked with the issue of command responsibility. This is
because under ICTR Statute Article 6(3) a clear duty is imposed upon
those in authority, with the requisite means at their disposal, to
prevent or punish the commission of a crime."128 Yet, an obligation to
act is not necessarily-let alone inextricably-linked with the issue of
command responsibility.1 29 An obligation which is not related to the
position of superiority should not trigger the application of the
superior responsibility doctrine.130

The search for a positive obligation to control subordinates also
included domestic law.' 3 ' For example, in Kayishema, the Trial
Chamber was of the opinion that "[i]n light of his [domestic law] duty
to maintain public order .

.

. Kayishema was under a duty to ensure

that these subordinates were not attacking those Tutsi seeking refuge

his superior responsibility. Id. at 155. Ratner and Abrams suggested at an earlier stage
that spatial factors be used as a means to limit (rather than create) superior
responsibility, so as not to set an affirmative duty that is too onerous on the superior.
For example, it would be restricted to camps, prisons, police offices or other confined
areas under the command of a military or civilian superior. STEVEN R. RATNER &
JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 129 (1st ed. 1997).
127.
See METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 152 (discussing the establishment of the
requisite mens rea).
128.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 1 202 (May
21, 1999).
129.
Cf. Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment, 59 (Oct. 16,
2007) ("[A] police officer may be able to 'prevent and punish' crimes under his
jurisdiction, but this would not as such make him a superior (in the sense of Article
7(3) of the Statute) vis-A-vis any perpetrator within that jurisdiction.").
130.
METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 52; see also Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case
No. ICTR-05-88-T, Judgment,
18 (June 22, 2009) ("[Sluperior responsibility under
Article 6 (3) . . . does not require proof that an order was given or that authority was
exercised to instruct someone to commit a crime, and is aimed at criminalizing an
omission to punish or prevent a crime from taking place."). But see BANTEKAS, supra
note 43, at 99-108 (discussing types of command and the extent of liability); Ilias
Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 573,
577 (1999) [hereinafter Bantekas, Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility]
("Iore specifically, it is a form of complicity through omission.").
131.
Nerlich, supranote 8, at 671.

334

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43313

in Mubuga Church."1 3 2 Leaving aside the fact that the duty in
question was not based on the superior status of the defendant, the
reliance on domestic law is problematic. International criminal law is
a distinct and separate system from domestic rubrics, and duties from
the former to do not simply permeate the latter. It is not that
domestic law has no place in the legal analysis. De jure authority, for
example, is learned from domestic legal provisions. 3 3 However,
when determining superior status for international criminal
purposes, domestic de jure authority should be taken simply as a fact
and not as a normative determination that binds the international
tribunal.134 The problem of reliance on domestic law is exacerbated if
that law does not provide for criminal responsibility at all.135 From
an international perspective, it would be a disappointing outcome if
international criminal responsibility, which aims to remedy the
normative flaws and fill the gaps of enforcement in domestic law,
were constrained by the very same flaws and gaps.136 In addition, in

132.
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
510; see also Prosecutor
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 897 (June 7, 2001).

v.

Had the Accused, as bourgmestre, an obligation to maintain order and security
in Mabanza commune, it would have been a gross breach of this duty for him to
have established roadblocks and then failed properly to supervise their
operations at a time when there was a high risk that Tutsi civilians would be
murdered in connection with them.
Id. The Trial Chamber notes that the prosecution would have to prove "that the
Accused was responsible for the administration of those roadblocks because he was
involved in their establishment, acquiesced to their continuing existence, or more
generally because they came under his control as bourgmestre." Id. 1 1011. But see
Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment,
660 (Feb. 25, 2004)
(finding that a domestic obligation to maintain public order could not constitute the
source of the obligation because it did not include a criminal sanction).
480-83 (analyzing the
133.
See, e.g., Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T,
defendant's de jure authority in light of Rwandan domestic law).
134.
See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 17, at 1010 (commenting
that "the national law of a State establishes the powers and duties of civilian or
military representatives of that State, but international law lays down the way in
which they may be exercised").
135.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment,
660 (Feb. 25, 2004) ("[T]he Chamber observes that this legal duty was not mandated by
a rule of criminal law. Thus, any omission of this legal duty under Rwandan law, even
if proven, does not result in criminal liability under Article 6(1) of the Statute.").
136.
In the Tokyo Trial, Judge Roling, in his dissent, relied on domestic law to
negate an international legal obligation. He opined that since Japanese law assigned
the care of prisoners-of-war exclusively to the war and navy ministries, Foreign
Minister Shigemitsu could not be held responsible for failing to discharge this
obligation, even though this exclusive assignment was in contravention of the Hague
Regulations. United States v. Araki, supra note 34, at 1041, 1138 (Roling, J.,
dissenting). The norm in question did not concern superior responsibility but the
government's direct responsibility, although Judge Roling relied on it (more accurately,
on its absence) in the context of superior responsibility. 1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra
note 32, at XV-XVI.
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view of the heterogeneity of domestic criminal laws, application of
domestic obligations would result in different treatment of defendants
according to the domestic law applicable to their conduct, even if they
act similarly and in similar substantive circumstances.13 7 This is
difficult to reconcile with the right to equality before the law and its
institutions. 3 8
In the absence of a clear source of obligation, the ad hoc
tribunals have in some cases based the obligation to prevent
subordinates from committing international crimes simply on the
superior status of the defendant or on his effective control over
subordinates.' 39 However, an obligation based directly on the ability
to act effectively creates a Good Samaritan principle as a basis for
international criminal responsibility. This problem is not mitigated
by the fact that the obligation is limited to superiors since, as
discussed in the following subpart, existing jurisprudence often bases
superiority itself on the mere ability to influence others.140 Even if a
Good Samaritan doctrine may advance the objective of preventing
international crimes, 14 1 it should be distinguished from superior
responsibility.
What was missing from international criminal law until the
adoption of the ICC Statute was a doctrine on the civilian superior's
obligation to prevent crimes by his subordinates, similar to Additional

137.
BASSIOUNI, supranote 112, at 444-45.
138.
ICTR Statute, supra note 13, art. 20(1); ICTY Statute, supra note 13, art.
21(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
arts. 1, 5, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
139.
See Prosecutor v. Boikoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, T 407 (July
19, 2008) ('The doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately predicated upon the
position of command over and the power to control the acts of subordinates.");
Prosecutor v. Halilovi6, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment, 1 38 (Nov. 16, 2005) (noting
"this duty to act arises by virtue of a superior's possession of effective control over his
subordinates"); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-O-1-42-T, Judgment, T 359 (Jan.
31, 2005) ("It is the position of command over the perpetrator which forms the legal
basis for the superior's duty to act. . . ."); Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, T 377 (Nov. 16, 1998) ("The doctrine of command responsibility is ultimately
predicated upon the power of the superior to control the acts of his subordinates. A
duty is placed upon the superior to exercise this power so as to prevent and repress the
crimes committed by his subordinates .... ). For the ICTR, see Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 202 (May 21, 1999) ("[U]nder Article
6(3) a clear duty is imposed upon those in authority, with the requisite means at their
disposal, to prevent or punish the commission of a crime."); Zhu Wenqi, The Doctrineof
Command Responsibility as Applied to Civilian Leaders: The ICTR and the Kayishema
Case, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF LI
HAOPEi 373, 377 (Sienho Yee & Tieya Wang eds., 2001) (discussing Kayishema and the
application of command responsibility to civilian leaders in that case).
140.
See infra Part III.B (discussing the relationships between influence,
effective authority, and de facto authority).
141.
BANTEKAS, supranote 43, at 88.
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Protocol Article 87(1).142 Even now, for the ad hoc tribunals to rely on

such a doctrine it must be established as a matter of customary
international law-or at least as a general principle of international
law143-that the ICTY has determined could be derived from existing
national systems of law. 144 The doctrine of superior responsibility is
indeed familiar to many legal systems, but it does not always fulfill
the explicit requirements of Article 6/7(3). For example, the mens rea
required under municipal systems is generally more stringent than
that specified under Article 6/7(3).145 Accordingly, identifying the
doctrine as a general principle of international law is problematic.
In conclusion, jurisprudence and scholarship have effectively
glossed over the source of the obligation to control subordinates,
particularly with respect to civilians and even more specifically in
civilian settings. Formally, ICC Statute Article 28 resolves this
matter by basing it on the superior-subordinate relationship.
Therefore, this relationship must be identified even more precisely.
B. De Facto Authority of Civilian Superiors
For a person to be regarded as a superior, he must have a
position of command (in a military context) or authority (a more
general term, applicable in both military and civilian settings).146
Authority is reflected in a hierarchical relationship, "which
distinguishes ... superiors from mere rabble-rousers or other persons

142.
Bantekas, Contemporary Law of SuperiorResponsibility, supra note 130, at
574-75.
143.
The restriction of the ICTY's jurisdiction ratione materiae to customary law
was intended to ensure that the Security Council does not create or purport to legislate
the applicable law. The U.N. Secretary-General, in his report on the establishment of
the ICTY, mentioned the possibility of recourse to general principles of international

law in specific contexts. Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, supra note 105, 11 58, 123, 124. If this rationale
nonetheless permits reliance on general principles in certain contexts, it can also
permit it in other contexts.
144.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovid, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, T 56-57 (Oct. 7, 1997).

145.

Cf. Marko Milanovic, An Odd Couple, Domestic Crimes and International

Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1139, 1143
(2007) (discussing the more stringent standards imposed with respect to the superior
responsibility of civilian superiors with respect to ICC Article 28).
146.
Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, 310 (June 30, 2006);
370 (Nov. 16, 1998). On
Prosecutor v. Delali6, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, Judgment,
terminology, see Ori, Case No. IT-03-68-T, 310 ("Thus, regardless of which chain of
command or position of authority the superior-subordinate relationship may be based,
it is immaterial whether the subordination of the perpetrator to the accused as
superior is direct or indirect, and formal or factual."). But see DelalU, Case No. ICTY96-21-T, 1 348 ("[T]he legal duties of a superior (and therefore the application of the
doctrine of command responsibility) do not depend only on de jure (formal) authority,
but can arise also as a result of de facto (informal) command and control, or a
combination of both.").
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of influence." 147 In addition to authority, "it is necessary that the
superior have effective control over the persons committing the
underlying violations of international humanitarian law, in the sense
of having the material ability to prevent and punish the commission
of these offences" in a meaningful and effective way.143
Authority may be de jure or de facto. 149 De jure authority means
that the superior has been officially assigned the position of authority
for the purpose of leading the other persons, who thereby are
considered his subordinates.1 5 0
De jure authority creates a
rebuttable presumption that effective control exists. 15 1 Authority in a
military setting is ordinarily de jure, making military superiors
relatively easy to identify.152 Superior status for the purpose of
superior responsibility may also be based on de facto authority. This
was recognized in Oelebidi, where the Appeals Chamber noted that
reliance on de facto powers is essential for enforcement of
humanitarian law in contemporary conflicts where "there may be
only de facto, self-proclaimed governments and therefore de facto
armies and paramilitaries groups subordinate thereto."1 53 The Trial
Chamber noted that de facto authority is necessary "in situations
such as that of the former Yugoslavia during the period relevant to
the present case-situations where previously existing formal
structures have broken down and where, during an interim period,
the new, possibly improvised, control and command structures, may
be ambiguous and ill-defined."1 54 Thus, both chambers of the ICTY

147.
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-01A-T, Judgment, J 40-43
(June 7, 2002); Zahar, supra note 106, at 609, 611.
148.
Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment,
59 (Oct. 16,
2007); Prosecutor v. Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-4A-A, Judgment,
85-86 (May
23, 2005); Delali6, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T,
378 (Nov. 16, 1998); see also Shany &
Michaeli, supra note 16, at 868-69 (discussing the requirement of effective control);
Zahar, supra note 106, at 609-10 (discussing the importance of demonstrating effective
control).
149.
Orid, Case No. ICTY-03-68-T, 696.
150.
Delalid, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, 1 646; Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 1 787 (Nov. 28, 2007); METTRAUX, supranote 42, at 139.
151.
See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 1 197 (Feb. 20,
2001).
In general, the possession of de jure power in itself may not suffice for the
finding of command responsibility if it does not manifest in effective control,
although a court may presume that possession of such power prima facie
results in effective control unless proof to the contrary is produced.
Id. Prosecutor v. Boikoski, Case No. ICTY-04-82-T, Judgment, 1 411 (July. 19, 2008)
(discussing that the Prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused was exercising effective control).
152.
See Ori6, Case No. ICTY-03-68--T, IT 310-11 for a discussion of some
exceptional cases.
153.
Delali6, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 1 193.
154.
Delali, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, 1 354.
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emphasized de facto authority as characteristic of quasi-state
structures.1 5 5
De facto authority is particularly significant with respect to
civilians because in situations of civil structure breakdown, the
authority wielded is not embedded in formal legal instruments. 156
The Trial Chamber also ruled that responsibility may be imposed by
virtue of a person's de facto position as a superior,' 5 7 provided that
"the exercise of de facto authority is accompanied by the trappings of
the exercise of de jure authority."15 8 By this, the Trial Chamber
meant that "the perpetrator of the underlying offence must be the
subordinate of the person of higher rank and under his direct or
indirect control."15 9 In subsequent cases, however, both the ICTY and
the ICTR rejected the requirement of de jure authority "trappings" to
establish de facto authority,160 and the term "de facto authority" took
on a broader meaning.161 A comparative analysis of case law is
difficult, since references can be found to a variety of different terms
that may or may not all amount to superior responsibility, such as
effective authority, actual control, de facto control, 62 de jure effective
control, de facto effective control,16 3 power of control,164 exercise of
control,165 de facto command, legal command and de facto
authority,166 de jure authority, de jure-like relationships,1 67 de facto
power,168 de jure power,169 and others.

309 (discussing the broadening of
155.
See Orik, Case No. ICTY-03-68-T,
liability to include less formal command structures where there may be only de facto
superiors). In the Kordi6 case, the authority of the vice president of a de facto
separatist political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian Community of
Herceg Bosna, was also at issue. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2T, Judgment, $ 402 (Feb. 26, 2001).
156.
See METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 143-44 (defining and discussing the
relevance of de facto authority).
157.
Delalid, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, 370.
Id. 646.
158.
159.
Id.
160.
Prosecutor v. Orik, Case No. ICTY-03-68-T, Judgment,
312 (June 30,
2006) ("Nor is it required that the superior generally exercises the trappings of de jure
authority."); Prosecutor v. Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, $ 87 (May
23, 2005).
161.
Ori6, Case No. ICTY-03-68-T,
308-09.
162.
All three expressions appear within Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,
299 (June 1, 2001). See also Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. ICTY-95-14/1-T, Judgment,
103 (June 25, 1999) (discussing
how both civilians and military police can be held responsible if they exert "effective
authority" over the perpetrators of crimes).
163.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence,
$ 141 (Jan. 27, 2000).
164.
Id. 144.
165.
Id. 148.
166.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment,
219 (May 21, 1999).
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Subsequent jurisprudence appears to have dropped two elements
of the Oelebi&i interpretation. The first is the relevance of de facto
authority to quasi-state structure as a substitute for de jure authority
in true-state structure. 170 The other is the requirement of hierarchy
or rank, discussed below. 171
The replacement of de facto authority as a characteristic of
quasi-state structure by de facto authority as a characteristic of an
informal relationship raises the question of the distinction between
de facto authority and influence. Mettraux emphasizes that de facto
authority is characterized by one party's expectation of obedience to
orders and the other party's parallel expectation of subjection. 172 He
argues that the sense of obligation to obey distinguishes de facto
73
authority from "an ability to convince, to prompt or to influence."'
However, this refinement is not enough, since a mutual expectation of
obedience can build on powers of influence, if the latter are
sufficiently strong. Thus, another element ought to be added to the
This
definition of de facto authority--organizational structure.
requisite reflects the rationale for the doctrine-the existence of a
social organization within which authority is legitimately wielded and
accepted, thus potentially generating compliance. Nonetheless, the
ICTY has on numerous occasions indicated that where the influence
reaches the level of "effective control,"174 it may also fulfill, or replace,
the requirement of de facto authority.175 For example, in Aleksovski,
the trial chamber said that "[effective] authority can be inferred from

152,
167.
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-01A-T, Judgment,
183 (June 7, 2002).
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 1 894.
168.
Id. T 881.
169.
See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement
170.
of de facto authority).
See infra p. 341 (discussing organizational hierarchy).
171.
See METrRAUX, supra note 42, at 144-45 (discussing the degree of authority
172.
that a de facto superior must possess).
Id. at 183.
173.
265-66 (Feb. 20,
Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,
174.
311 (June 30, 2006);
2001); Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. ICTY-03-68-T, Judgment,
59 (Nov. 16, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment,
Prosecutor v. Kordi6, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1 840 (Feb. 26, 2001). This
followed numerous cases in the ICTR where the Celebidi Trial Judgment was
mistakenly taken as authority for reliance on influence to establish superiority. See,
e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 1 220 (May 21,
1999) ("[Tlhe Chamber in Celebici concluded that they authoritatively asserted the
principle that, 'powers of influence not amounting to formal powers of command
provide a sufficient basis for the imposition of command responsibility."').
175.
See Delalie, Case No. IT-96-21-A, T 198 ("As long as a superior has
effective control over subordinates, to the extent that he can prevent them from
committing crimes or punish them after they committed the crimes, he would be held
responsible for the commission of the crimes if he failed to exercise such abilities of
control."); see also infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (providing examples of
instances in which the ICTY made determinations about effective control).
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the accused's ability to give [the direct perpetrators] orders and to
punish them in the event of violations." 176 Similarly, in Musema, the
ICTR held that "a superior's authority may be merely de facto,
deriving from his influence or his indirect power." 177 It added that
"[t]he influence at issue ... often appears in the form of psychological
pressure."1 78 In both cases, influence went to the issue of authority
rather than to that of effective control.
This Article argues that the requirement of authority, in the
sense of organizational hierarchy, must neither be set aside nor
replaced by powers of influence. Instead, it must be established
independently of, and prior to, the exercise of effective control.17 9 In
other words, while de jure authority creates a presumption of
effective control, effective control (let alone mere influence) should not
alone create a presumption of de facto authority. If mere influence,
even of the highest degree, is accepted as a basis for superior
responsibility, any civilian held in sufficiently high social esteem
would automatically be transformed into a superior, increasing the
chance that he be tried as a result of the crimes of others.18 0 At the
same time, the determination of whether de facto authority exists has
to be made with flexibility, given that informal structures are central
to the question.
Equally important is the need to avoid confusion between
authority in one sphere of life and influence in another. This problem
is unique to civilian settings because, in the military, subordinates
are subject to an internal disciplinary system and may be regarded as
on duty twenty-four hours a day.181 The law thus assumes that the
authority and effective control of a military commander cover all
activities of the subordinates, so there is only one all-encompassing
sphere.1 82
In contrast, in a civilian setting, subordinates are
normally under the authority and control of superiors only while
engaged in work-related activities,18 3 and the responsibility attaching

176.
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment,
103 (June
25, 1999).
177.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence,
T 144 (Jan. 27, 2000).
178.
Id. 1 140.
179.
See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 17, at 1013 ("The concept of
the superior is broader and should be seen in terms of a hierarchy encompassing the
concept of control.").
180.
Provided that other requirements such as mens rea are fulfilled. Zahar,
supranote 106, at 600.
181.
METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 32-33; VAN SLIEDREGT, supra note 27, at 184.
182.
See METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 32-33 (discussing the broader scope of
authority for military superiors).
183.
William J. Fenrick, Article 28 Responsibility of Commanders and Other
Superiors, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT-OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 515, 522 (Otto Triftterer ed., 1st ed.
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to superiority is limited to crimes committed in that context.184 In
Musema, the ICTR identified the defendant's status as superior on
the ground that he could remove or threaten to remove an individual
from his position at the tea factory if the latter was identified as a
perpetrator of crimes punishable under the Statute 85 as well as to
prevent or punish the use of tea factory property in the commission of
such crimes. In so doing, the ICTR erroneously linked work-related
de jure authority to non-work-related effective control. Once the
subordinates terminate their work day, the employer is not
accountable for controlling their conduct. Musema's authority did not
extend beyond work' 8 6 even if his effective control over his employees
persisted because he could use his work-related powers to influence
their conduct.
Musema's power was not based on legitimate,
pertinent organizational hierarchy.' 8 7
One might imagine that, in a centralized system, the terms of
employment grant the employer authority over his employers even
outside work, with sanctions available within the work environment.
Yet, this was not established in Musema, where the Trial Chamber
noted expressly that the employees were a priori not under Musema's
authority. 8 8 One may find an indication that the Trial Chamber was
uncomfortable with its own conclusion in its mention of the fact that
Musema had the authority to punish the use of factory property,
implying that the direct perpetrators were committing the crimes in
their capacity as employees.' 89
However, the acquiescence in
employees' use of factory property outside work does not
automatically generate responsibility for their actions while using
that property. The Trial Chamber surely did not mean that Musema
should have disciplined or penalized the employees for massacring
and raping because they were doing so while wearing factory
uniforms. 9 0
In conclusion, in civilian settings there is need for a careful
distinction between de facto authority and influence. This requires

1999). The same would be applicable, mutatis mutandis, in superior-subordinate
relations in non-work related settings, such as educational and religious organizations.
184.
Rome Statute, supranote 13, art. 28(b)(ii).
185.
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13--A, Judgment and Sentence,
880 (Jan. 27, 2000).
186.
In the circumstances, Musema was, of course, responsible because of his
direct, active involvement.
187.
See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13--T, Judgment, 144 (Jan.
27, 2000) (discussing whether Musema "had power of control over persons who a priori
were not under his authority").
188.
Id.
Id. T 880.
189.
Predicting this conundrum, Fenrick argued in 1999, before the Musema
190.
Trial Judgment was handed down, that if "the employees of a paint factory engaged in
genocidal activities outside of work hours, it is unlikely that the factory manager would
be regarded as liable under article 28." Fenrick, supra note 183, at 521.
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the identification of, among other factors, a pertinent pre-existing
organizational structure.
C. DistinguishingSuperior Responsibility from
Direct Responsibility
The absence of a clear hierarchy and the often horizontal division
of powers in civilian organizations also makes it difficult to
distinguish between direct and superior responsibility in a civilian
setting.191 For a person to be held responsible in connection with a
particular crime because he failed to exercise his duty as a superior,
the facts underlying the duty must exist prior to the commission of
the crime. Accordingly, the superior-subordinate relationshipincluding authority-must be established independently of the crime
and with respect to the time prior to the commission of the crime. 9 2
In Blaski, the ICTY noted that for superior responsibility to attach,
both the hierarchy and the dereliction of duty to prevent the crime
must have occurred prior to the commission of the subordinate's
crime.19 3
Nonetheless, the ICTR has, in some cases of civilian defendants,
deduced the superior-subordinate relationship from the facts that
established the crimes themselves rather than from preexisting
authority and control. In Kajelijeli, for example, the Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the defendant held a de facto superior
position over the direct offenders (Interahamwe) on the basis of
evidence that the assailants reported to him daily what had been
achieved; he instructed the Interahamwe to kill and exterminate
Tutsis; he directed the Interahamwe to join that attack; he

191.
See METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 103-05, 107 (describing the lack of clarity
in apply superior responsibility to civilians).
192.
See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment,
76
(Mar. 24, 2000) ("[A] superior must have such powers [to prevent subordinates from
committing crimes or to punish them afterwards] prior to his failure to exercise
them."); GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1131-33
(2005) (discussing the establishment of authority for military commanders and civilian
superiors). A different reasoning might apply to the obligation to punish, which is not
explored in this article in detail. At the same time, in Prosecutor v. Hadlihasanovid,
Case No. ICTY-01-47-T, Judgment, 1 198 (Mar. 15, 2006), it was decided that a
position of command undertaken after the fact of the crime does not require taking
enforcement measures against the offender. Bonaf6, supra note 5, at 610. For an
example of asserting the superior-subordinate relationship as a basis for the duty,
preceding the crime, see Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Third
Amended Joinder Indictment, I 36-38 (June 21, 2006).
193.
Prosecutor v. Blagki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, 1 664 (July. 29,
2004) C[Ilf the superior's intentional omission to prevent a crime takes place at a time
when the crime has already become more concrete or currently occurs, his
responsibility would also fall under Article 7(1) of the Statute.").
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transported armed assailants; he ordered and supervised attacks; he
bought beers for the Interahamwe while telling them that he hoped
they had not spared anyone; and he "played a vital role in organizing
and facilitating the Interahamwe in the massacre . .. by procuring
weapons, rounding up the Interahamwe and facilitating their
transportation." 194 As the appeal judgment points out, all these
indicators establish that the appellant played a pivotal role in the
execution of the crimes.
However, contrary to the tribunal's
conclusion, these indicators do not prove that the defendant was the
superior of the principal offenders prior to the offense, and therefore,
they should not have been considered sufficient to generate an
obligation upon Kajelijeli to prevent the Interahamwe from carrying
out the attacks.1 95
Different uses of the concept of "ordering" may explain the
reliance on hierarchy during the commission of the crime to establish
a superior position. When a person orders another to commit a crime,
as did Kajelijeli, his action constitutes the actus reus required for
attaching direct responsibility under Article 6/7(1) of the ad hoc
tribunals' statutes.196 Ordering may also be an indicator of the
effective control required for attaching superior responsibility under
Article 6/7(3).197
The difficulty in distinguishing the two is also
demonstrated in Serushago, where the ICTR convicted the defendant
under Article 6(3) of its statute for having "played a leading role" in
the crime. 19 8
The Trial Chamber mistakenly conceived the
superiority in Article 6(3) as a reference to leadership in the
commission of the crime rather than to status that generates a
responsibility to prevent subordinates from committing crimes.19 9 A
careful distinction is therefore required between de facto authority
preceding the crime (which may generate superior responsibility) and
leadership during the commission of the crime (which does not). This
argument is distinct from the question whether concurrent
convictions for direct and superior responsibility are appropriate.
The latter question presumes the status of superiority of the
defendant. It is on this preliminary issue that the present discussion

194.
Prosecutor v. Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-4A-A, Judgment, 1 90 (May
23, 2005).
195.
If the chain of events is broken up into separate incidents, the defendant's
leadership may have created a de facto superiority, which generates responsibility with
respect to subsequent acts. The ICTR did not address this issue. As pointed out with
respect to Musema, the entire discussion of a leading accomplice's failure to prevent
what he instigated, aided and abetted, is problematic to say the least.
196.
Kajelijelii,Case No. ICTR-98-4A-A, 90.
197.
See id. at 176-78 (discussing the Trial Chamber's treatment of orders in

Delalia).
198.
1999).
199.

Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Judgment,
Id.

28 (Feb. 5,
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focuses, arguing that superiority cannot be acquired through the
commission of a crime. A person who became a superior exclusively
by virtue of actively directing the commission of the crime should not
be held responsible for not preventing the crime, and his
responsibility should be exhausted under Articles 6/7(1).
Mettraux argues that the ability to order may generate an ad hoc
superiority and, consequently, superior responsibility "for the purpose
of the act which he ordered them to carry out, and for the purpose of
that act only."200 In light of the present argument, this approach is
unacceptable because it requires leadership in the commission of the
crime to generate responsibility for failing to prevent the same crime.

IV. BACK TO NAHIMANA

As highlighted earlier, Nahimana is the first conviction by either
of the ad hoc tribunals based on the superior responsibility of a
civilian operating within a purely civilian setting.20 ' Moreover, it is
the first case before the ICTR where no concurrent conviction was
made on the basis of direct responsibility. 202 As such, Nahimana is a
useful case for examining the challenges considered in this Article. 203
Ferdinand Nahimana was born in Rwanda in 1950. From 1977
until 1984, he held various posts at the National University of
Rwanda. He was also a member of the Mouvement R6volutionnaire
National pour le D6veloppement (MRND) political party. In 1990, he
was appointed Director of the Rwandan Office of Information and
remained in that post until 1992. He and others then initiated the
establishment of the Radio T416vision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM) radio station, owned largely by members of the MRND party.
RTLM started broadcasting in July 1993 and was a popular source of
information. Its broadcasts engaged in ethnic stereotyping, branding
Tutsis as the enemy and Hutu opposition members as their
accomplices. 204 After April 6, 1994, the virulence and the intensity of
RTLM broadcasts propagating ethnic hatred and calling for violence

200.
Mettraux, supra note 106, at 275.
201.
See supra Part II.C.
202.
Id.
203.
In the analysis of superior responsibility under Art. 6(3), the Appeals
Chamber relied extensively on the factual findings of the Trial Chamber. See
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, J 603-36, 777-857
(Nov. 28, 2007). However, in view of significant differences between the judgments in
other areas (such as the convictions under Art. 6(1), which were quashed), the present
analysis will refer to the Appeal Judgment.
204.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, 1 5, 342,
344-45 (Dec. 3, 2003).
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increased, and the ICTR found that certain RTLM broadcasts in that
period constituted direct and public incitement to genocide.20 5
The ICTR found that Nahimana had been a superior of the
RTLM staff.206 It also found that Nahimana knew or had reason to
know that his subordinates at RTLM were going to engage in
For these reasons, it convicted him on
incitement to genocide.
superior responsibility grounds for not having taken reasonable and
necessary steps to prevent the incitement or punish its
perpetrators. 20 7

A. Nahimana's Status as Superior
The ICTR accepted as fact that Nahimana held no official
function at RTLM. 20 8 This led to the question of whether he had
exercised de facto authority. The tribunal answered this in the
affirmative, relying on several factors.2 09 First, the ICTR found that
Nahimana was "the brain behind the project" and "the boss who gave
orders." 210 This description referred to Nahimana's status in RTLM
prior to the commission of the crimes. It expressly noted that
Nahimana's membership in the RTLM's Steering Committee had not
vested him with de jure authority but did suggest "de facto a certain
general authority within RTLM." 211 Nahimana had played a role of
primary importance in the creation of RTLM in 1993 and had control
over RTLM company finances.2 12 He and others referred to him as
the Director of RTLM. 213 The ICTR found further evidence for
Nahimana's authority and control in the facts that he had been "in
contact with RTLM and familiar with its future plans" 2 14 and that his
intervention with RTLM journalists had halted attacks against
General Dallaire and UNAMIR. 215
The ICTR found de facto authority on the basis of a preexisting
Moreover,
organizational structure and actual functioning.
Nahimana's de facto authority was largely a substitute for the
Steering Committee's de jure authority. 216 Thus, although RTLM
was a private organization rather than a state organ, the ICTR could

205.
206.
207.
208.
28, 2007).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
758.
Id. 822.
1044-45.
Id.
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, T 808 (Nov.
Id.
796-800.
Id. 808.
Id. T 804.
Id. TT 803, 805.
817.
Id.
Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A,
Id. 833.
Id. TT 796-800.

827-28.
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rely on the "trappings" of de jure authority. The circumstances
allowed a successful application of the doctrine according to the
stricter requirements suggested in this Article. The same is also true
in some other respects: the crime was committed within the scope of
Nahimana's responsibility as defined by the Trial Chamber, and,
exceptionally, this is not a case of complicity in the commission of the
crime. Although the Appeals Chamber hinted that Nahimana knew
of the crimes,2 17 there is no indication that his silence constituted
moral or material assistance to the broadcasters.2 1 8 The ICTR's
conclusions on Nahimana's superior responsibility are thus
straightforward and raise no particular difficulties. This forthright
application may explain why, despite the Nahimana case's unusual
civilian setting, post-2003 literature on superior responsibility makes
little reference to it.
B. The Obligation to Control Subordinates
The judgment considered at length the internal operation of
RTLM. 219 The Appeals Chamber recalled that Nahimana chaired the
Technical and Programme Committee of RTLM, which had a
delegated responsibility and authority from the station's board of
directors "to oversee the programming of RTLM." 220 As Chairman of
the Committee, Nahimana had a specific obligation to take action to
prevent or punish the criminal broadcasts. 221 Nahimana's obligation
was therefore based on an internal procedure. Given the reservations
expressed above as to reliance on domestic law to create an obligation
to control subordinates for the purpose of international criminal
responsibility, reliance on an internal organizational procedure-not
even a general norm of law-is problematic.
Furthermore, while Nahimana's obligation to prevent the crimes
arose from his status as Chairman of the Technical and Programme
Committee, his superior position stemmed from his de facto standing
as director. 222 In the specific circumstances, the two converged in one
person. Nonetheless, he had an obligation to prevent the crimes in
one capacity and the material ability to do so in another. 223 Would a
different Committee chairperson not have been held responsible if he
had no effective control? Conversely, would a different director not

840-41.
Id.
217.
218.
His silence also did not amount to commission through others, another
possible basis for conviction. OLASOLO, supra note 8, at 111-16.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, J1 342-619
219.
(Dec. 3, 2003).
Id. 1 556.
220.
Nahimana,Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, $ 807.
221.
Id.
806, 817.
222.
223.
Id.
781 n.1819, 806-07, 813-14.
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have been held responsible if he had no obligation as chairperson?
The ICC Statute provisions would have bridged this gap by deriving
Nahimana's obligation to prevent criminal broadcasts directly from
his status as the superior of the broadcasters. This may have
influenced the ICTR. It is also noteworthy that Nahimana was
convicted on the basis of superior responsibility for a genocide-related
crime rather than for war crimes. 224 The holding is thus unique in
the application of the doctrine.
V. SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
BE EXTENDED TO CIVILIAN SETTINGS?

The above analysis demonstrates that the criteria for superiority
are difficult to apply in civilian settings, both normatively and
factually. As a result, civilian superior responsibility remains an
elusive legal category that is established ex post facto. Nevertheless,
the issue of superior responsibility in civilian settings appears to be
increasingly pertinent. In Bikindi, for example, the prosecution
argued that the director of a dance troupe should be regarded as a
superior mandated with preventing crimes by members of the
troupe.2 25 Such developments raise the questions of both whether
superior responsibility is indeed appropriate for civilian settings, and
if it is, whether it should take the same form as in military
settings. 22 6
In view of ICC Statute Article 28, the expansion of the superior
responsibility doctrine to civilians may appear a foregone conclusion:
Article 28(a) covers military commanders and civilians acting as
military commanders; conversely, Article 28(b) covers civilians acting
in a civilian capacity. 22 7 However, the travaux prdparatoiresfocus on
the identity of the superiors, not of the subordinates, and leaves
unresolved the question of whether Article 28(b) covers all civilian
settings or only civilians leading (but not embedded) in military and
paramilitary organizations (such as ministers of defense (leading the
military), ministers of interior (leading internal security forces), or
militia leaders).2 28 As the review of practice above indicates, even to

224.

Id. $ 1018.

225.
Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgment, $ 412 (Dec. 2,
2008); Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-2001-72-I, Amended Indictment, Counts
2, 5 (June 15, 2005).
226.
Bonaf6 argues that the doctrine should be limited to military personnel.
Bonaf6, supra note 5, at 602.
227.
Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 28(a}-(b).
228.
Mettraux considers the possible criteria for classifying whether a case falls
within the ambit of Article 28(a) or 28(b). Both he and Fenrick limit themselves to
instances of military or paramilitary subordinates. METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 28-29;
Fenrick, supra note 183, at 517. In Roberta Arnold & Otto Triffterer, Article 28, in
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the extent that superior responsibility of civilians already forms part
of customary international law, practice regarding civilian settings is
so limited that it is hard to establish that the customary norm
already applies to them.
In light of the analysis above, which indicated that the
application of the doctrine to civilian settings is fraught with
challenges, the first question is whether it is at all advisable to have a
superior responsibility doctrine applicable to civilian settings.
Superior responsibility builds on the significance of authority and
control in affecting the conduct of others. 229 These exist in the
pyramid-shaped hierarchy of the military, which permits superiors to
affect systematically the conduct of their subordinates and thwart the
commission of widespread crimes. Superior responsibility is
particularly appropriate in the military where it concerns
international crimes, which are, by definition, committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack or as part of a plan or policy or a
large-scale commission of crimes. 230

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTOBSERVER'S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 183, at 795, 840, the authors
propose that Article 28(b) concerns non-military members of governments, political

parties, or business companies.
229.

Recent experience indicates that recognized liability for omission could
have an important function in the prevention and termination of what
is justifiably called 'systemic war criminality.' Acknowledgement of
such responsibility would stimulate in marked degree the concern of
high military and civilian authorities for the maintaining of the laws of
warfare.

1 THE TOKYO JUDGMENT, supra note 32, at XVI; see also Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case
39 (Nov. 16, 2005) (discussing the purpose behind the
No. IT-01-48-T, Judgment,
concept of command responsibility, which is to ensure compliance with the laws of war
and international humanitarian law, and protect protected categories of people and
objects); Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility
From Yamashita to Blagki6 and Beyond, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 638, 663 (2007) ("In
addition to these retributive justice rationales, command responsibility doctrine also
reflects a utilitarian understanding of the most effective means of preventing violations
of international humanitarian law.").
Rome Statute, supra note 13, arts. 7(1), 8(1). No similar qualification exists
230.
with respect to the crime of genocide. The large-scale element in genocide is implied in
the mens rea of the crime. WERLE, supra note 192, at 29; Cress Kraus, The Darfur
Report and Genocidal Intent, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 562, 576 (2005). Schabas argues
that as a matter of policy, genocide should only be of interest to the international
criminal justice system if it is state-sponsored rather than attempted on an individual
basis. See generally WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CRIME OF CRIMES 447-503 (2d ed. 2009). This would imply a similar qualification that
it be large-scale or systematic. But see Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-10-A,
Judgment, 1 48 (July 5, 2001).
The Appeals Chamber is of the opinion that the existence of a plan or policy is
not a legal ingredient of the crime. However, in the context of proving specific
intent, the existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor in most
cases. The evidence may be consistent with the existence of a plan or policy, or
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Civilian superiors do not necessarily benefit from a plurality of
subordinates, and where they are not part of a machinery that can
generate systemic criminality, there is less reason to impose on them
an international obligation to prevent such criminality.
The
duplication of the doctrine to civilian settings is therefore not selfevident. Nonetheless, there is no reason to exempt civilians from
responsibility for controlling their subordinates where they do have
the authority and material ability to do so-particularly if effective
control is not measured by comparison to military commanders but in
light of the specific circumstances of the case. The factual differences
between superiors in civilian settings and superiors in military
settings are not such that they justify a normative exclusion of the
former.
Thus, for example, attaching superior responsibility to
superiors would seem more justified in the civil service than in other
institutions. 23 1
An example of an organized, hierarchical civilian setting that
was evidently capable of generating international crimes was the
Nazi propaganda machine. 232
Moreover, as the ICTY has
highlighted, the borderline between civilian and military persons
(and, one may add, settings) is fluid. 233 The difficulty of classification
is already apparent in the context of state responsibility with regard
to the laws of armed conflict; 234 it could equally manifest itself in a

may even show such existence, and the existence of a plan or policy may
facilitate proof of the crime.

Id.
231.
Moreover, if international crimes are defined as perpetrated by the state or
by quasi-state actors, potential civilian superiors would only include civil servants and
persons holding similar positions, or at most private individuals who are informally,
but effectively participating in government. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 112, at 443-45
(referring to industrialists and businessmen); ROB CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL
ROBINSON & ELIZABETH WILMHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 5 (2007) (noting that one would need to be an agent in order to
commit a crime under this view). Musema, the only civilian other than Nahimana
convicted by the ICTR for his superior responsibility over civilian subordinates, was
appointed director of the Gisovu Tea Factory by Rwanda's president. Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, 1 12 (Jan. 27, 2000).
232.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 112, at 1-40 (describing the efforts in that arena
by the Nazi regime).
233.
Prosecutor v. Ori6, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, T 309 (June 30, 2006)
The second implication is that, in relation to the power of the superior to
control, it is immaterial whether that power is based on a de jure or a de facto
position. Although formal appointment within a hierarchical structure of
command may still prove to be the best basis for incurring individual criminal
responsibility as a superior, the broadening of this liability as described above
is supported by the fact that the borderline between military and civil authority
can be fluid.

Id.
234.
See generally, HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture v. Israel
[2006] IsrSC 597 (involving the targeted killing of Palestinians by the Israeli Defense
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criminal law context.23 5 In Rwanda, for example, the status of the
Interahamwe was ambiguous. On the one hand, they were a youth
movement associated with a civilian political party. On the other
hand, they featured some of the characteristics of military units that
might affect the scope of responsibility attaching to their leaders,
principally the engagement in armed force. In conclusion, superior
responsibility should extend to civilian settings. Nonetheless, courts
and tribunals should examine it with care, given the potential pitfalls
on the road to establishing its elements. It is regrettable that ICC
Statute Article 28 nevertheless obliges the ICC judges to engage in a
delineation of categories. 236
This leads to the second question-whether different normative
standards should apply in civilian settings and in military settings.
ICC Statute Article 28(b) distinguishes civilian settings from the
military setting described in Article 28(a) in two respects. First, the
responsibility of superiors in civilian settings covers only instances
where the "crimes concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior." 237 As discussed above, 238
this condition merely reflects the factual difference that, in the
military, superiors are held responsible for controlling their
subordinates at all times while superiority in civilian settings is
temporally limited. The second difference is the required mens rea.
Superiors in the military are held responsible if they "knew or, owing
to the circumstances at the time, should have known" of the crimes.
For superiors in civilian settings, the applicable standard is that they
"knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated" the crimes.23 9
Opinions on the meanings of these
standards and their advisability differ. 240 However, there is no

Forces). Under the laws of armed conflict the disregard for categories would be more
complicated because these categories are fundamental to the whole system and are
codified in conventional law.
For example, private security companies. See Fenrick, supra note 183, at
235.
521 (discussing the possibility that private military personnel could be held liable);

Chia Lehnardt, Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under International
Criminal Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1015, 1029 (2008) (discussing the liability of private
military personnel).
236.
For possible parameters for this deliberation and the associated difficulties,
see METTRAUX, supra note 42, at 27-30.
237.
Vetter argues that if this is the purpose of Art. 28(b)(2), then it is
redundant. Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the
InternationalCriminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J. INTL L. 89, 120 (2000) ("[U]nder this
interpretation, article 28(2)(b) might be superfluous because the scope of the superiorsubordinate relationship is articulated in both article 28(1) and 28(2).").
238.
See supra Part III (discussing the difference in roles between civilian and
military leaders).
239.
Rome Statute, supranote 13, art. 28(b)(i).
240.
Ambos, supra note 105, at 863-871; Bantekas, Contemporary Law of
Superior Responsibility, supra note 130, at 587-91; Damaika, supra note 5, at 455-56;
Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
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dispute that the standard for responsibility in civilian settings is
stricter. It has already had a spillover effect to the ICTR. In
Kayishema, the Trial Chamber said that "the distinction between
military commanders and other superiors embodied in the Rome
Statute [is] an instructive one." 241 It then applied the ICC Statute's
mens rea standard for civilian superiors to Article 6(3), despite the
explicitly different wording of the ICTR Statute. 242
The differentiated mens rea requirement was proposed during
the negotiations on the Statute by the United States and was adopted
enthusiastically by other delegations. 24 3 Two specific grounds were
given for it.244 Interestingly, although both grounds referred to
"military commanders" as opposed to "civilian supervisors," both
make more sense if they are taken as justifications for a distinction
between military and civilian settings, rather than between military
and non-military commanders. At the same time, neither argument
is convincing.
One argument was that the lower standard, perceived as
negligence, is appropriate in a military context because military
commanders are in charge of an inherently lethal force, and therefore
it is not appropriate for civilian supervisors and is contrary to the

Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 120-22 (2005); Heller, supra note 6, at 17-20; Kirsten M.F.
Keith, The Mens Rea of Superior Responsibility as Developed by ICTY Jurisprudence,
14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 617, 617 (2001); Major James D. Levine II, The Doctrine of
Command Responsibility and its Application to Superior Civilian Leadership:Does the
InternationalCriminal Court Have the Correct Standard? 193 MIL. L. REV. 52, 71-76
(2007); Martinez, supra note 229, at 663; Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, The Last Line of
Defense: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Gender Crimes in Armed
Conflict, 22 WIs. INT'L L.J. 125, 137-47 (2004).
241.
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, TT 227-28
(May 21, 1999).
242.
Moreover, Kayishema was held responsible for failing to prevent crimes
committed by gendarmes, soldiers, prison wardens, armed civilians, and members of
the Interahamwe. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment,
299
(June 1, 2001). It is not clear that these circumstances fall under the 'civilian' limb of
Article 28 rather than the military one.
243.
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998,
Official Records 136-38,
67-83, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) [hereinafter ICC
Conference Official Records]; Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE-ISSUES,
NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 203-04 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2002).
[The United States raised an important point: whether civilian superiors
would normally have the same degree of control as military commanders and
should therefore incur the same degree of responsibility .... The points made
by the United States met with a growing understanding. An idea developed for
a new structure for the article that would incorporate different requirements
for military and civilian superiors.
244.

ICC Conference Official Records, supra note 243, at 136-37,

$T

67-68.
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usual principles of criminal law responsibility. 245 Indeed, superior
responsibility reflects the tremendous power of military commanders,
who are ordinarily mandated with responsibilities that have a direct
effect on life and death. 246 They are given license to turn ordinary
men into lethal, destructive soldiers. They are also entrusted with
powers to cause extensive harm. The corollary to these powers is
responsibility.
When soldiers abuse their power, it is the
commanders' failure no less than that of their soldiers. 247
However, while it is true that criminal responsibility for
negligent action is appropriate only for the gravest crimes that
involve potentially lethal force, the assumption that the military
holds a monopoly on these crimes is misplaced. Indeed, both the
notion of civilians involved in international crimes and the existence
of non-conflict related international crimes defy this assumption.
There is no reason to hold a superior to a lower standard of behavior
depending on whether he operates in a civilian setting or in a military
setting. What should determine responsibility is his authority and
effective control, not the classification of the situation.
Another argument in support of the mens rea distinction is that
the authority and effective control of military commanders rests on
the military discipline system, whereas there is no comparable
punishment system for civilians in most countries. 248 It is true that
military commanders have a severe disciplinary apparatus at their
disposal and that they are, therefore, presumed to possess the means
to ensure the compliance of their subordinates with international
law. 249 In civilian settings, the effective control of a civilian superior
over the conduct of subordinates falls short of that of a military
commander,2 50 for example, in allowing only limited incursions on
fundamental rights and freedoms of subordinates.
However, the relevance of this statement to the matter of mens
It merely asserts that because apparent
rea is questionable.
superiors in civilian settings are less likely to be regarded as

245.
246.
247.

Id.
Fenrick, supra note 183, at 516; Martinez, supra note 229, at 662.
See Martinez, supra note 229, at 662-63.

By the internal logic of the laws of war, the soldier is not responsible for his
actions, either in the sense of legal liability or in the sense of exercising agency
in the moral decision to use lethal force against another human. But this
belligerent's privilege is inextricably intertwined with the commander's
responsibility for the soldier's actions, and a military commander's duty to
control his troops is the necessary corollary of his power.
248.
ICC Conference Official Records, supra note 243, at 136, $ 67.
249.
Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid, Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, 1 66 (Mar.
15, 2006).
250.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 112, at 392 (noting that a civilian hierarchy does
not provide for as much control over subordinates as a military hierarchy).

2010/

SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY IN CIVILIAN SETTINGS

353

exercising effective control than in military settings, their designation
as superiors is less likely in the first place. The likelihood of passing
the threshold of effective control for a superior-subordinate
relationship, however, is unrelated to the question of mens rea, which
arises only after a superior-subordinate relationship has been
established. If a superior-subordinate relationship is found to exist,
there is no reason why the mens rea requirement should be altered. 251
However, if a person is found to exercise, in specific circumstances,
authority and a level of control that are sufficient to hold him a
superior, 252 he should not be tested against a different standard of
behavior than a superior in a military setting simply because there
might have been even greater control or harsher punishment in the
military setting.2 53
The ICTY's statement in Oelebiti-that the
doctrine of superior responsibility applies to civilian superiors "only
to the extent that they exercise a degree of control over their
subordinates which is similar to that of military commanders" 254 may have informed the ICC deliberation. However, subsequent
jurisprudence interpreted Oelebii as setting "effective control" as a
minimum threshold for superior responsibility, in either military or
civilian settings, 25 and not as a comparative benchmark.
In conclusion, neither of the reasons given during the
deliberation on the ICC Statute for the mens rea distinction appears
convincing. A different justification may be that involvement in
international crimes in the context of organizational conduct-which
is a condition for superior responsibility-is more likely in military
settings than in civilian ones. Civilian organizations are not, by
definition, engaged in enterprises that run the risk of international
crimes. Superiors in the military should therefore be more alert to
the possibility of international crimes being committed, and they may

251.
See Andrew D. Mitchell, Failureto Halt, Prevent or Punish:The Doctrine of
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 22 SYDNEY L. REV. 381, 405 (2000) (arguing
that there is "no real policy reason for regarding the behaviour of civilian leaders as
being of less concern than that of military leaders"); Vetter, supra note 237, at 94 ("A
weaker civilian command responsibility standard is undesirable because it will not
deter civilian superiors to the same extent as military commanders.").
252.
Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung Kang, Criminal Liability for the Actions of
Subordinates-The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and its Analogues in United
States Law, 38 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 272, 291-92 (1997).
253.
As pointed out above, the assertion to this effect in Prosecutor v. Delali6,
Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, Judgment, 377-78 (Nov. 16, 1998) was later rejected.
254.
Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment,
197 (Feb. 20,
2001); Delali, Case No. ICTY-96-21-T, T 378.
255.
Prosecutor v. Boikoski & Tardulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment,
T 409 (July 10, 2008) ("Civilian superiors incur criminal responsibility pursuant to
Article 7(3) of the Statute under the same circumstances as military commanders.");
Nahimana v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, 1 785 (Nov. 28, 2007);
Prosecutor v. Kajelijelii, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, 1 87 (May 23, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment, T 55 (July 3, 2002).
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be held to a higher level of responsibility to act positively to acquire
knowledge and to prevent the commission of the crimes. Even this,
however, is debatable: conduct of subordinates that may involve the
commission of international crimes would be easily detectable by the
superior because of its exceptionality. Therefore, there is no reason to
allow the civilian superior to remain indifferent where a military
commander is bound to take investigative measures.
In short, there does not seem to be a strong controlling
justification for the distinction between military settings and civilian
settings in terms of the mens rea requirement. Again, given the
fluidity of the border between the two categories, the preferable route
would have been for the characteristics of each individual to be
examined directly, without attempting to go through a prior
civilian/military dichotomous classification. The application of the
doctrine would have differed in view of the circumstances of different
types of defendants, as a matter of factual-rather than normativedifferences.
At the same time, the criticism that the different-and higherthreshold for culpability of superiors in civilian settings effectively
results in impunity for political leaders who can feign ignorance 256 is
also not entirely justified. First, in light of the analysis proposed
here, civilian leaders of military organizations are subject to Article
28(a), in which case they are subject to the lower mens rea standardto the more demanding standard of behavior. Even if civilians
heading military forces fall within Article 28(b), the difference
between them and military commanders may find expression well
before the mens rea issue arises, namely at the stage of determining
the superior-subordinate relationship, since civilian leaders are often
only the indirect superiors of the military forces. Despite rhetoric
that superior responsibility may apply to indirect superiors,2 5 7 in
practice indirect superiority may be too far removed from the
perpetrator for the superior to be regarded as exercising effective
control.
Therefore, it is not clear that a tribunal applying
international law could regard civilian leaders as superiors for the
purpose of criminal responsibility. 258 Indeed, the notion of superior

256.
James Cockayne, Foreword, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1061, 1063 (2007);
Vetter, supra note 237, at 120.
257.
Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment,
59 (Oct. 16,

2007); Prosecutor v. Kordid, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment,

1 828

(Dec. 17, 2004);

Prosecutor v. Blaski6, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, T 67 (July 29, 2004); Delalid,
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 1 251-52, 303; Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52A, 1 785.
258.
For example, Milutinovid was acquitted of responsibility under Art. 7(3)
because he was too far removed from the perpetrators to be regarded as in effective
control, even though it had been established that he knew of the crimes. Prosecutor v.
Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment, Vol. 2, 1 270 (Feb. 26, 2009). During the
negotiations of the ICC Statute, the Jordanian delegate foresaw this difficulty. ICC
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responsibility may be more suitable for tactical superiors rather than
for strategic superiors.
On the other hand, evasion of superior responsibility does not
mean impunity for civilian leaders. They may be held directly
responsible for their acts (as those who order, conspire, instigate, and
aid and abet) or omissions (e.g., with respect to of obligations towards
various categories of population). 259 Indeed, in the cases brought
before the ICTR prior to Nahimana, superior responsibility always
accompanied direct responsibility and was secondary to it.
In conclusion, it is not the limits of superior responsibility that
result in impunity of civilian leaders, and lowering the threshold of
mens rea with respect to civilian superiors would not necessarily
contribute towards ending such impunity.
VI. CONCLUSION

The analysis in Part III of this Article indicated that the doctrine
of superior responsibility of civilians and in civilian settings may not
have been as well grounded in customary international law as the
ICTY posited in Oelebidi. The ICTY and ICTR have contributed to the
development of the doctrine, but, as Part IV demonstrates, various
challenges that arise in civilian settings have been treated
inadequately. Part V argues that the application of the doctrine to
civilian settings is nonetheless appropriate as a matter of policy. It

Conference Official Records, supra note 243, at 137, 72. For a similar concern, albeit
based on a different definition of a superior's duty, see Ilias Bantekas, The Interests of

States Versus the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility, 838 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 391,
391-402 (2000).
259.
Consider, for instance, Kambanda, Kalimanzira, and the indictments of
Milosevi6 and Karadii. In the International Military Tribunal for Germany, for
example, the Nazi leadership was held directly responsible for its crimes, without need
to resort to the principle of superior responsibility. W.J. Fenrick, Some International

Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 103, 112 (1995). An instance, often
mentioned in this regard, is the finding, in the Report of the Kahan Commission of
Inquiry into the massacre at the refugee camps in Beirut in 1982, on the personal
responsibility of then-Minister of Defense of Israel, Ariel Sharon. Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, 22 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 473, 473-518 (1983). This case raises issues outside the scope of this
article-e.g., troop assignments. It is nonetheless worth noting that the Commission
found that Sharon disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the
Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps when he decided to have the
Phalangists enter the camps, and failed to order appropriate measures to prevent or
reduce the danger of massacre as a condition for that entry. These blunders
constituted "the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was
charged," without clearly relying on the doctrine of superior responsibility. For a
discussion of this case in light of the doctrine of superior responsibility, see Shany &
Michaeli, supra note 16, at 876-86.
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further contends that categorical normative distinctions between
military and civilian superiors in the ICC statute are unmerited,
since they neither serve a justifiable policy objective nor correspond to
a clear factual division. It would have been preferable to set the same
normative standards to all situations and let the different individual
circumstances determine the extent of responsibility on an
evidentiary level. At the same time, it is important not to overstate
the importance of the doctrine of superior responsibility.
Its
limitations prevent it from resolving the responsibility of every highranking individual, but it is only one of many tools available under
international criminal law. It is more important to focus on the
practicability of the doctrine with respect to the more numerous,
lower- and mid-level superiors who, because they are not the
instigators of crimes, can be realistically expected to prevent them.

